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strength and confronts it with annual data for Germany. The results show that union power 
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1 Introduction
In the last two decades, Germany has been characterised by a number of trends and
developments which seem to suggest that trade union power has faded: Wages and
unit labour costs have risen less than in other countries (see Schulten, 2008; Joebges
et al., 2009), real net wages have even fallen in some years (Horn et al., 2008), and the
labour share in national income has been reduced (Arpaia et al., 2009). In addition,
union membership and density have fallen substantially and bargaining coverage
shows clear signs of erosion (Addison et al., 2007; Ellguth and Kohaut, 2010).
While most observers might agree that these developments can be interpreted as
indications of organised labour's limited success in achieving its goals, there is no
generally accepted indicator of trade union power. To be sure, there exists a large
and controversial literature on the concept and measurement of union militancy
and power that can at the least be traced back to Chamberlain (1951).1 But this
literature has not resulted in a widely accepted concept of union power, in
uence, or
strength. While some consensus has been achieved that a good indicator should be
based on objective data (rather than subjective judgements), it has proved dicult
or even impossible to develop an indicator that is unambiguously an index of union
power or militancy and not capable of other interpretations (e.g., as a proxy for
employer resistance in wage bargaining).
In the following, we therefore do not attempt the impossible, i.e. deriving an
indicator that is only sensitive to variations in the degree of independent pressure
exerted by trade unions. We rather take a well-known bargaining model seriously
and attempt to infer the strength and power of the labour movement by drawing
conclusions from its success in wage bargaining and wage setting. In doing so, we
1 Building on insights and concepts by Hicks, Pigou, Commons, Dunlop, and others,
Chamberlain (1951) dened union bargaining power by the ratio of the expected costs of
disagreement with its terms for the employer to his expected costs of accepting them, but
this ratio depends on subjective estimates and usually can hardly be measured. For detailed
discussions on the concept and measurement of trade union militancy and power, see Purdy
and Zis (1974), Armstrong et al. (1977), and Hirsch and Addison (1986, pp. 220{224). Recently,
Pencavel (2009) has proposed a measure of union success or welfare that combines union
density and the relative union{nonunion wage gap.4
satisfy the requirement for a good indicator deemed most important by Purdy
and Zis (1974, p. 47), namely that it `should be justied in terms of a reasonably
well formed theory of wage determination', in such a way overcoming one crucial
decit of existing indicators of union power (such as the labour share or union
membership). Building on the right-to-manage model of collective bargaining by
Nickell and Andrews (1983), which can be regarded as an adequate representation
of wage bargaining in Germany, we try to infer the value of the union bargaining
power parameter from the results in wage setting, taking account of further variables
of interest such as taxation, unemployment benets, and the labour market situation.
We then confront our model with annual data for Germany and are able to calculate
a time-varying index of union strength for the years 1992 to 2009. This index will
show that union power has 
uctuated substantially in Germany, exhibiting a marked
fall in recent years.
Our paper lls a gap in the literature in that it derives an easily computable
and time-varying indicator of union strength from a widely used bargaining model
that takes account of the fact that in most European countries bargaining is over
wages only whereas management retains the right to set employment unilaterally.
We thus improve upon previous attempts of measuring union power that either used
an ecient bargaining model assuming simultaneous bargaining over wages and
employment (McDonald and Suen, 1992), tried to distinguish between bargaining
power over wages and over employment (Sanfey, 1993), or estimated the union
bargaining parameter econometrically by making strong exogeneity assumptions
(Doiron, 1992) and constraining this parameter to be constant over time (Svejnar,
1986). Furthermore, by taking into account institutional factors such as taxation and
unemployment insurance our approach gives a richer and more informative picture
than standard one-dimensional proxies of union strength like the labour share or
union density.
The outline of the paper is as follows: In Section 2 we sketch the institutional
background of wage setting in Germany and develop our theoretical model. The5
implementation of the model with data from Germany is described in Section 3.
Section 4 presents the empirical results of our investigation, and Section 5 concludes.
2 Institutional Background and Economic
Modelling
In Germany, the constitutionally protected principle of bargaining autonomy gives
trade unions and employers the right to regulate wages and working conditions
without state interference. Collective agreements are legally binding and may be
concluded either as multi-employer agreements at sectoral level or as single-employer
agreements at rm level.2 Unlike the situation in the UK or the US, collective
bargaining in Germany is still mainly conducted at the sectoral level between a single
union and an employers association. Although sectoral negotiations mostly take place
in regional bargaining units, the regional negotiations within one sector are closely
coordinated by the ocials of the appropriate sectoral trade union and employers
association, so that variations between them are small. There is even a measure
of cross-sectoral coordination by unions and employers, which has resulted in some
uniformity in collective bargaining policy. Collectively agreed norms are minimum
terms (and substitute for the lack of a legal minimum wage in Germany). This means
that rms bound by (sectoral or rm-level) collective agreements cannot undercut,
but only improve upon these terms and conditions. While a minority of rms do pay
higher wages than stipulated in the collective agreements (for details on this wage
cushion, see Jung and Schnabel, 2011), for most employees the wages set in collective
agreements are of crucial importance, aecting the level and development of their
actual wages. Despite a fall in bargaining coverage in the last decade, in 2009 still
more than 80 percent of employees in Germany were directly or indirectly covered
by the results of collective bargaining (see Ellguth and Kohaut, 2010, Table 1).
Collective bargaining in Germany takes place over a number of issues. It
2 In addition, rms have the right not to conclude collective agreements, in which case they
make use of individual contracts with their employees. About 50 percent of these individual
contracts, however, use sectoral collective agreements as a point of reference (see Ellguth and
Kohaut, 2010).6
predominantly concerns wages, which usually are negotiated annually, but also
determines job classications, working time, and working conditions (over longer
periods of time). Employment, however, is typically not a bargaining issue in
Germany, not least since it would be almost impossible to set employment levels
for individual rms in the sectoral multi-employer agreements which predominate.3
This is in accordance with international evidence suggesting that typically `unions
and rms do not bargain simultaneously over wages and employment' (Booth, 1995,
p. 128). In multi-employer as in single-employer agreements in Germany, rm
management retains the right to determine employment unilaterally. This suggests
that the right-to-manage model (as proposed by Nickell and Andrews, 1983), in
which a single union and an employer (or employers association) bargain over wages
and the rms are then free to choose any employment level at this bargained wage,
is likely to t the institutional setting in Germany better than alternative models
such as the ecient bargaining model.
We therefore start by setting out a simple right-to-manage model that serves as
the backbone of our following analysis of union bargaining power. Consider a labour
market consisting of a representative union and a representative employer engaged
in collective bargaining. Assume rst that the union is a utility maximiser, where
its utility function U(!;L) is both strictly increasing in the net wage paid to its
members ! and in the level of employment L among its members. More specically,
we assume utilitarian union preferences
U(!;L) = L! + (1   L)z = L(!   z) + z; (1)
where z is the (expected) income when unemployed, the overall labour supply is
normalised to unity, and every worker is supposed to be a union member.4 The union
3 Even in single-employer agreements at the rm level it is very rare to nd instances of union{
rm bargaining over both wages and employment. Some exceptions are the employment pacts
(or `alliances for jobs') negotiated in recent years in some large rms which sometimes include
limitations in pay increases in exchange for employment guarantees. For more details on
employment pacts we refer to Bellmann et al. (2008).
4 The latter is assumed merely for convenience. If only a part of the working population was
unionised, the same results would follow as long as union membership is exogenously given.7
thus maximises its utility by maximising the overall income of both employed and
unemployed (unionised) workers. Since U is linear in the net wage and the income
when unemployed, this implies that the unions assumes workers to be risk neutral
and thus maximises their expected income. For simplicity we consider a linear tax
system, so the net wage ! is
! = w(1   w); (2)
where w is the gross wage and w the sum of the income tax rate and the part of
the payroll tax rate paid by workers.
Next, turn to the employer. The employer is assumed to use a constant-returns-
to-scale Cobb-Douglas production technology. Its revenue function is
Y (K;L) = pL
K
1  (3)
with the (exogenous) product price p, the labour and capital inputs L and K,
respectively, and the output elasticity of labour , where 0 <  < 1. For expositional
convenience, we normalise in the following both p and K to unity.5 The employer's
prots are thus given by
(w;L) = Y (L)   w(1 + f)L   i; (4)
where Y (L) = L, f is the part of the payroll tax rate levied from the employer,
and i is the interest rate.
Now, turn to the wage bargaining in our simple right-to-manage model. In a
rst step, the union and the employer (or an employers association) are assumed
to bargain over their joint surplus to determine w. After that, the employer is
However, things will dier if union membership and wages are simultaneously determined
(e.g., Booth and Chatterji, 1995), so that the union will account for the consequences of its
bargaining behaviour on membership development.
5 Note that the assumption of an exogenously given price is consistent both with perfect
competition and monopolistic competition (with a constant markup on marginal cost) on
the goods market.8
free to choose any employment level at this bargained wage. Obviously, he will
choose an employment level that maximises his prots. For any given level of
labour cost w(1 + f), the employer's employment level thus will lie on his labour
demand schedule, which corresponds to the marginal revenue product of labour.
Algebraically, the labour demand curve is thus given by
L







In the preceding wage bargaining, both parties take the employer's labour demand
behaviour represented by equation (5) as given. The (gross) wage bargained w is
assumed to follow from a generalised Nash bargaining solution. When no agreement
is reached, the union's utility is z, which is the utility level { see equation (1) { when
no worker is employed, whereas the employer's prots are  i, i.e. his xed capital
costs. Therefore, the union's net gain in the bargaining is the economic rents of its
members, while the employer's net gain is the dierence between his revenues and
his variable costs. Accounting for the rm's optimal labour demand behaviour as












with 0 6  6 1, which serves as a measure of the bargaining strength of the
union. The bargained wage w = argmax
w

(w) now solves the rst-order condition

0(w) = 0.6
Given w and the other parameters included in the Nash maximand (6), instead
of solving 
0(w) = 0 for w we can alternatively solve it for  to arrive at the
implied bargaining power of the union. Doing this yields (for a full derivation, see
6 This solution means that the union takes the income when being unemployed z as exogenously
given and not to be in
uenced by the bargaining outcome. This notion is consistent with a
general equilibrium in an economy consisting of many identical employer{union pairs that





w(1   w)   z
z
: (7)
To grasp an intuition of equation (7), rst note that labour cost equals the marginal
revenue product of labour since we have a solution on the employer's labour demand
curve { though at a lower level of employment compared to perfect competition.
Hence, Euler's theorem applies, and  represents the labour share whereas 1   
gives the capital share. Union power therefore depends, on the one hand, positively
on the importance of the labour share relative to the capital share. In this sense,
part of the union's bargaining strength is accounted for by just looking at the labour
income share which has often served as a traditional proxy for union power. On the
other hand,  also depends positively on the gap between the net wage bargained
and the income when unemployed and thus is in
uenced by all factors { including
institutional factors { governing this gap.
3 Implementation of the Model
In order to implement the model and infer the union's bargaining strength from the
data, it is useful to add some more structure to the model. This allows us to gain
additional insight into the factors in
uencing the income when unemployed z and
thus the determinants of union power. We follow Layard et al. (1991, p. 145) by
imposing a simple search-theoretic structure. In every period, unemployed workers
are assumed to search for a job and to receive unemployment benets b. Suppose
that (acceptable) job oers arrive with some exogenous probability . In a stationary




[b + Ve + (1   )Vu] (8)
with the worker's discount rate r. Equation (8) holds as the unemployed worker
receives unemployment benets b and nds a job yielding the value of being employed10
Ve with probability , while he or she stays unemployed with converse probability
1  achieving the value of being unemployed Vu. Assume further that all jobs pay
the bargained gross wage w, and workers are laid o at some exogenous probability





(1   w) + (1   )Ve + Vu]: (9)
Equation (9) re
ects that the employed worker receives the net wage w(1 w) and
is laid o with probability  yielding the value of being unemployed Vu, while he or
she stays in the job with the converse probability 1    and achieves the value of
being employed Ve.
Combining equations (8) and (9) and solving for rVu, the (
ow) income when
unemployed z = rVu is
z =
r + 
r +  + 
b +

r +  + 
w
(1   w) = b +

r +  + 
[w
(1   w)   b]; (10)
i.e. a weighted average of unemployment benets b and the net wage w(1   w).
Since in a steady-state environment the unemployment rate u is not changing, that
is the 
ow into unemployment (1 u) equals the 
ow out of unemployment u, we
have  = u=(1   u). Plugging this into equation (10), the expected income when
unemployed becomes
z = b +
1   u
d(1   u)r + 1
[w
(1   w)   b]; (11)
where d := 1= gives the average unemployment duration.
Together, equations (7) and (11) allow us to infer the implied bargaining power
 of the union from data on (i) the labour share , (ii) the net wage w(1   w),
(iii) unemployment benets b, (iv) the steady-state unemployment rate u, (v) the
average unemployment duration d, and (vi) the worker's discount rate r.7 While
7 Note that our assumption of a steady-state environment means that equation (11) is only
valid as long as unemployment is not changing too rapidly, for otherwise the steady-state11
the labour share represents technological factors determining the importance of
labour in production, factors related to the economic and institutional environment,
such as taxes, benet generosity, structural unemployment etc., are captured in the
other variables that determine the gap between the net wage and the income when
unemployed. Hence, the development of the implied union bargaining strength 
should provide a richer and more informative picture than the standard look at the
labour share.
The data used stem from a variety of sources and are calculated as follows:
Labour share data (corrected for structural change by holding employment shares
constant) are provided by the Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Aairs (2010).
Data on average unemployment compensation per month are published by the
Federal Employment Agency (2010). Correspondingly, we use net monthly wages
per employee, which are taken from the National Accounts.8 We de
ate both series
by the consumer price index of the Federal Statistical Oce. The steady-state
unemployment rate is approximated by applying a Hodrick{Prescott lter (with
the usual smoothing parameter of 100) to the annual data for the unemployment
rate published by the Federal Employment Agency (2010). Average unemployment
duration is calculated using the data provided and the formula suggested by the
Federal Employment Agency (2010, p. 36). The worker's discount rate is set at the
conventional value of 0.05.9
4 Results
Figure 1 presents values for  based on equations (7) and (11) and calculated using
the annual data described above, which are available for the period 1992 to 2009.
approximation may work poorly.
8 We thus have to use actual (or eective) wages rather than the bargained wages referred
to in our theoretical model since data on the latter only exist in form of an index (but not
in absolute values that are required for comparison with unemployment compensation); the
consequences of this limitation are discussed below.
9 Note that our results are not sensitive to choosing a dierent discount rate or to the
way we approximate the steady-state unemployment rate. Applying dierent lters to the
unemployment rate, utilising the NAIRU estimates provided by D'Auria et al. (2010), or
using the actual unemployment rate does not aect our results substantially.12
From the solid line it can be seen that union power in Germany was relatively stable
in the 1990s with a slight peak in 1999. From 2002 to 2007, it fell substantially (by
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Figure 1: Union power (solid: calculated according to equations (7) and (11);
dashed: corrected for changes in working hours; dotted: corrected for
wage drift)
In order to take account of certain limitations of our data, we also present two
alternative calculations of union power that can be regarded as a sort of robustness
check. First, since we are only able to use monthly but not hourly wage data (because
the corresponding unemployment compensation is only available per month), it could
be argued that changes in working time also play a role for monthly wages. Average
working hours per employee have 
uctuated and have fallen substantially (by about
10 percent) in our period of observation. Taking crudely account of this by keeping
working hours constant at their 1992 level results in the dashed line in Figure 1.
While this line lies above the solid line, a similar pattern emerges, with union power
being fairly high between 1999 and 2002, and then falling substantially until 2007.
Second, it is an open question whether union power should be assessed by looking13
at the direct results of collective bargaining (i.e. bargained wages for those employees
covered by collective agreements) or by looking at actual wages, which is what all
employees in fact are paid. Whereas the rst concept is closer to bargaining power
in the strict sense of our theoretical model, the latter concept is wider, allowing
for spillover eects (i.e. that employers not bound by collective agreements are also
in
uenced by these when setting wages) and taking into account that even employers
bound by collective agreements may not fully pass on bargained wage increases
(if they have a wage cushion of higher wage levels than stipulated in collective
agreements that can be reduced). As noted above, we have to use actual wages
rather than the bargained wages referred to in our theoretical model since data on
the latter only exist in form of an index but not in absolute values that are required
for comparison with unemployment compensation. If changes in bargained wages
usually transform almost exactly in changes in actual wages (as found for annual
data in the cointegration analysis by Schnabel, 1997), this limitation is not serious.
Note, however, that some negative wage drift seems to have occurred in recent years
(i.e., actual wages for all employees rising less than bargained wages for employees
covered, for instance because not all employers are bound by collective agreements).
In this case, our indicator above relying on eective wages might overestimate the
fall in union bargaining power. While in principle wage drift could be calculated
using existing indices of (changes in) actual and bargained wages, the data bases of
these indices are very dierent, and serious methodological problems suggest to be
very cautious in interpreting such wage drift results (for details, see Schnabel, 1997,
pp. 134{136). Nevertheless, we try to take account of wage drift by calculating the
ratio of the Bundesbank index of bargained hourly wages and of an index of actual
average hourly wages (obtained from the National Accounts) and correcting the
actual wage used in our calculations accordingly. This exercise results in the dotted
line in Figure 1. As expected, this line lies above the solid line, but the pattern is
quite similar, with union power reaching a high in 1999, and then falling substantially
until 2007.14
It might be interesting to identify the driving forces between these developments.
Recall that according to equation (7), union power  depends positively on two
factors: on the importance of the labour share relative to the capital share (i.e.
=(1 )), and on the gap between the net wage and the income when unemployed
(i.e. [w(1 w) z]=z). The relative contribution of these two factors to the annual
changes in the power index shown in Figure 1 can be calculated, and it is found
to vary considerably from year to year. On average, in the period 1992 to 2009,
changes in both factors contributed almost equally to the annual changes in the
union power index observed: changes in the labour share relative to the capital share
were responsible for 48 percent of the variation in the union power index, whereas
changes in the gap between the net wage and the income when unemployed explain
the remaining 52 percent. A closer look reveals that the small rise in union power
observed in the period 1992 to 1999 was almost exclusively the result of increases in
the gap between the net wage and the income when unemployed, whereas two-thirds
of the fall in union power from 1999 to 2007 follow from the reduction in the labour
share relative to the capital share. The small rise in our indicator of union power
during the `Great Recession' in 2008/09 is solely driven by an increase in the labour
share (relative to the capital share) re
ecting special circumstances: Due to massive
government intervention (such as short-term work and scal stimuli) employment
and the wage bill decreased less than expected given the size of the recession and
also less than capital income.
Interestingly, union power remained relatively stable during the conservative-
liberal coalition government of chancellor Helmut Kohl, which was in power until
1998 and was not regarded as particularly union-friendly. In contrast, the substantial
fall in union power observed later started when a seemingly more pro-union coalition
government led by the social-democratic chancellor Gerhard Schr oder was in power
(until 2005). Against massive union opposition, this government introduced the so-
called `Hartz reforms' aimed at improving labour market dynamics in Germany
which became eective in three steps in the years 2003 to 2005 (for details, see, e.g.,15
Fahr and Sunde, 2009). The impact of these reforms is ambiguous in our model:
On the one hand, reductions in the availability and generosity of unemployment
benets b decrease the income when unemployed z. On the other hand, improved
labour market prospects (i.e. a shorter average duration d and a lower incidence u of
unemployment) increase z. Overall, z slightly decreased from 2004 onwards, but net
wages fell even more, partly re
ecting union wage moderation. Whereas this results
in a fall of union power , it only accounts for one-third of the total reduction in union
power (as pointed out above). The remaining two-thirds are due to the exceptionally
steady fall in the labour share in Germany from 2000 to 2007 which occurred not
only in an upswing but also during the preceding recession. While Arpaia et al.
(2009, p. 2) show that `labour share movements are driven by a complex interplay
of demand and supply conditions of capital and dierent skill categories of labour,
the nature of technological progress and imperfect market structures', the relative
importance of these forces for the fall of the labour share in Germany is an open
question and beyond the scope of this paper.
5 Conclusions
Building on the right-to-manage model of collective bargaining, which can be
regarded as an adequate representation of wage bargaining in many European
countries, we have tried to infer the value of the union bargaining parameter from
the observed results in wage setting. We have derived a time-varying indicator of
union strength and confronted it with annual data for Germany from 1992 to 2009.
The results make clear that union power was relatively stable in the 1990s but fell
substantially (by almost one-third) from 2002 to 2007.
Our analysis is open to some criticism. From a theoretical point of view, although
the assumptions of a Cobb-Douglas production technology, a linear tax system,
and a steady-state environment are pretty standard in the literature, they may be
regarded as quite restrictive. Moreover, our analysis is based on the assumption16
that the equilibrium outcome lies on the labour demand curve.10 Empirically,
it may be questioned whether an aggregate analysis is really the best way to
investigate union power, but unfortunately disaggregate data of the sort needed in
our framework (in particular net wages and unemployment benets) are not available
for Germany. Another data-related problem is that we have to analyse actual rather
than bargained wages. Yet, this can also be seen as an advantage since it re
ects
a wider concept of union power and in
uence allowing for spillover and wage drift
eects of bargained wages. Nevertheless, given suitable data it would of course also
be interesting to analyse bargained wages and thus get a better understanding of
union bargaining power in a narrower sense. For this sort of exercise, the sectoral
level would seem to be the most appropriate level of analysis.
While it would be interesting to extend the analysis to micro data, even an
aggregate analysis of the type presented here does have some advantages over
previous attempts to measure union power. It is based on an established theory
of wage determination, it takes account of factors such as taxation, unemployment
benets, and the labour market situation, and it is more informative than just
looking at the labour income share, union density, or bargaining coverage. A case
in point is that the substantial reduction in the labour share does only explain two-
thirds of the fall in union power in Germany observed after 1999, whereas changes
in the gap between the net wage and the income when unemployed account for
the remaining third.11 Given that in many countries the labour share has fallen
and the punch of the labour movement seems to have weakened in recent years,
a comparative analysis across European countries with right-to-manage bargaining
may be a promising avenue of future research.
10 This assumption may not be that restrictive given that some theoretical papers show that
ecient outcomes may also lie on the labour demand curve and that the (mostly Anglo-
Saxon) empirical evidence on this point is inconclusive (for an overview, see Booth, 1995,
pp. 134{141). What is more, the institutional setting in Germany clearly justies making such
an assumption.
11 Note also that our indicator of union power is positively but not perfectly correlated with the
other traditional one-dimensional proxies. The respective correlation coecients are 0.66 for
union density and 0.80 for multi-employer bargaining coverage.17
A Derivation of Equation (7)
In order to derive expression (7) for union bargaining power , we rst derive the





(w) as given by equation
(6), where the logarithmic transformation substantially eases the following steps.
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After some straightforward simplications on the rst-order condition of problem







w(1   w)   b




Solving (A.2) for  yields (7). 18
References
Addison, J.T., Schnabel, C., and Wagner, J. (2007), `The (parlous) state of
German unions,' Journal of Labor Research, 28(1):3{18.
Armstrong, K.J., Bowers, D., and Burkitt, B. (1977), `The measurement
of trade union bargaining power,' British Journal of Industrial Relations,
15(1):91{100.
Arpaia, A., P erez, E., and Pichelmann, K. (2009), Understanding labour
income share dynamics in Europe, European Commission, Brussels, European
Economy, Economic Papers No. 379.
Bellmann, L., Gerlach, K., and Meyer, W. (2008), `Company-level pacts
for employment,' Jahrb ucher f ur National okonomie und Statistik (Journal of
Economics and Statistics), 228(5+6):533{553.
Booth, A.L. (1995), The Economics of the Trade Union, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Booth, A.L. and Chatterji, M. (1995), `Union membership and wage bargaining
when membership is not compulsory,' Economic Journal, 105(429):345{360.
Chamberlain, N.W. (1951), Collective Bargaining, New York: McGraw-Hill.
D'Auria, F., Denis, C., Havik, K., McMorrow, K., Planas, C.,
Raciborski, R., R oger, W., and Rossi, A. (2010), The production function
methodology for calculating potential growth rates and output gaps, European
Commission, Brussels, European Economy, Economic Papers No. 420.
Doiron, D.J. (1992), `Bargaining power and wage{employment contracts in a
unionized industry,' International Economic Review, 33(3):583{606.
Ellguth, P. and Kohaut, S. (2010), `Tarifbindung und betriebliche Interessen-
vertretung: Aktuelle Ergebnisse aus dem IAB-Betriebspanel 2009,' WSI-
Mitteilungen, 63(4):204{209.
Fahr, R. and Sunde, U. (2009), `Did the Hartz reforms speed-up the matching
process? A macro-evaluation using empirical matching functions,' German
Economic Review, 10(3):284{316.
Federal Employment Agency (2010), Arbeitsmarkt 2009, N urnberg: Federal
Employment Agency.
Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (2010), Statistisches
Taschenbuch 2010, Bonn: Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Aairs.
Hirsch, B.T. and Addison, J.T. (1986), The Economic Analysis of Unions: New
Approaches and Evidence, London: Allen & Unwin.
Horn, G., Logeay, C., and Zwiener, R. (2008), Wer protierte vom
Aufschwung?, Institut f ur Makro okonomie und Konjunkturforschung, D ussel-
dorf, IMK Report No. 27.19
Joebges, H., Logeay, C., Sturn, S., and Zwiener, R. (2009), Comparison of
German labour costs with other European countries: Only a marginal increase,
Institut f ur Makro okonomie und Konjunkturforschung, D usseldorf, IMK Report
No. 44.
Jung, S. and Schnabel, C. (2011), `Paying more than necessary? The wage
cushion in Germany,' Labour, 25(2):182{197.
Layard, R., Nickell, S.J., and Jackman, R. (1991), Unemployment:
Macroeconomic Performance and the Labour Market, Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
McDonald, I. and Suen, A. (1992), `On the measurement and determination of
trade union power,' Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 54(2):209{224.
Nickell, S.J. and Andrews, M. (1983), `Unions, real wages and employment in
Britain 1951{79,' Oxford Economic Papers, 35(Supplement):183{206.
Pencavel, J. (2009), `How successful have trade unions been? A utility-
based indicator of union well-being,' Industrial and Labor Relations Review,
62(2):147{156.
Purdy, D.L. and Zis, G. (1974), `On the concept and measurement of trade union
militancy,' in D. Laidler and D.L. Purdy (eds.), `In
ation and Labour Markets,'
pp. 38{60, Manchester: Manchester University Press.
Sanfey, P.J. (1993), Changes in Union Bargaining Power in Britain, 1971{1989,
University of Kent at Canterbury, Studies in Economics, No. 93/16.
Schnabel, C. (1997), Tari
ohnpolitik und Eektivlohnndung { Eine empirische
und wirtschaftspolitische Analyse f ur die alten Bundesl ander, Frankfurt a. M.:
Peter Lang.
Schulten, T. (2008), `Europ aischer Tarifbericht des WSI 2007/2008,' WSI-
Mitteilungen, 61(9):471{478.
Svejnar, J. (1986), `Bargaining power, fear of disagreement, and wage settlements:
Theory and evidence from U.S. industry,' Econometrica, 54(5):1055{1078.